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  An	  earlier	  version	  of	  this	  paper	  was	  written	  as	  an	  Invited	  chapter	  for	  the	  forthcoming	  book	  on	  the	  "Legal-­‐
Economic	   Institutions,	  Entrepreneurship,	  and	  Management",	  Nezameddin	  Faghih	   (editor)	  Springer.	  We	  
are	   grateful	   to	   comments	   from	   anonymous	   referees	  whose	   insightful	   comments	   helped	   us	   focus	   the	  
analysis.	  We	  remain	  solely	  responsible	  for	  any	  remaining	  errors.	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Abstract	  
This	   paper	   reviews	   the	   recent	   experience	   of	   importing	   countries’	   contingent	  
protection	  measures	  against	   input	   subsidies	   from	  escalated	  export	   taxes	   in	  biodiesel	  
imports	  from	  Argentina.	  The	  analysis	  indicates	  that	  the	  end	  result	  of	  a	  WTO	  that	  is	  empty	  
of	  rules	  on	  primary	  agricultural	  export	  barriers	  opens	  the	  door	  for	  arbitrary	  policies	  by	  
exporting	   countries	   and	   leaves	   importing	   countries	   without	   a	   legal	   right	   to	   impose	  
compensating	  contingent	  measures.	  This	  was	  made	  clear	  by	  the	  findings	  of	  the	  WTO	  
Panel	   and	   Appellate	   Body	   in	   the	   Argentina-­‐EU	   biodiesel	   case.	   Nevertheless,	   under	  
Trump’s	  charge	  against	  the	  multilateral	  trading	  system,	  since	  December	  2019	  the	  WTO	  
Appellate	  Body	   remains	  non-­‐functioning	  and	   therefore,	   importing	  countries	   can	  now	  
impose	  counteracting	  measures	  without	  risking	  a	  negative	  legal	  finding	  as	  the	  EU	  faced.	  
As	   illustrated	  by	   the	  US	  contingent	  measures,	  a	  non-­‐functioning	  Appellate	  Body	  now	  
facilitates	  arbitrary	  measures	  by	  importing	  countries.	  The	  obvious	  solution	  to	  this	  mess	  
is	  to	  include	  WTO	  rules	  on	  agricultural	  export	  barriers,	  and	  reinstate	  the	  the	  Appellate	  
Body	  to	  normal	  functioning.	  	  
	  
JEL	  Codes:	  F13,	  F14,	  Q18.	  	  
Trade	  policy	  institutions;	  Biodiesel;	  Agricultural	  export	  barriers;	  Argentina;	  Contingent	  
protection;	  European	  Union;	  US	  unilateralism;	  WTO	  Appellate	  body).	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I.   Setting	  the	  issue:	  missing	  WTO	  rules	  on	  agricultural	  export	  barriers	  
Under	   multilateral	   trade	   rules,	   obligations	   come	   hand	   in	   hand	   with	   rights.	   A	  
country’s	  obligations	  to	  follow	  certain	  rules,	  say	  compliance	  with	  multilateral	  safeguard	  
rules,	  automatically	  entails	   that	  country’s	  right	  to	  demand	  that	  other	  WTO	  Members	  
also	   comply	   with	   such	   obligations.	   In	   this	   way,	   Members	   ensure	   that	   their	   trade	  
institutions	  (rules	  of	  the	  game)	  remain	  at	  par	  with	  that	  of	  their	  trading	  partners.	  	  
What	  happens	  when	  WTO	  Agreements	  provide	  no	  rules	  on	  certain	  trade	  policies?	  
We	  argue	  that	  absence	  of	  rules	  in	  one	  area	  cripples	  the	  system	  and	  opens	  the	  door	  to	  
policy	   arbitrariness.	   Such	   absence	   also	   raises	   legal	   difficulties	   as	   occurs	   for	   example,	  
when	   importing	   countries	   seek	   to	   counteract	   the	   negative	   consequences	   of	   policies	  
associated	  with	  some	  unregulated	   trade	   flow.	  This	  will	   come	  out	  quite	  clearly	   in	  our	  
analysis	  of	  Argentina’s	  subsidized	  biodiesel	  export	  that	  have	  relied	  on	  agricultural	  export	  
barriers.	  	  
Following	   the	   pressures	   that	   came	   mostly	   (but	   not	   exclusively)	   from	   industrial	  




.	  For	  Argentina’s	  governments	  since	  the	  early	  millennium	  years,	  this	  failure	  
facilitated	   the	   implementation	   of	   escalated	   export	   tax	   policies.	   This	   escalation,	  
according	  to	  which	  the	  export	  tax	  rate	  on	  the	  processed	  product	  is	  lower	  than	  the	  rate	  
applied	  on	   its	  major	   intermediate	  primary	   inputs,	  results	   in	  subsidies	  that	  may	  cause	  
injury	  to	  the	  competing	  industries	  of	  importing	  countries.	  	  
The	  WTO	  legal	  vacuum	  on	  agricultural	  export	  barriers	  led	  Argentina’s	  governments	  
to	  once	  again	  set	  high	  barriers	  against	  the	  country’s	  major	  agricultural	  products.	  Table	  
1	  shows	  that	  for	  three	  of	  these	  products,	  barriers	  included	  high	  export	  taxes	  as	  well	  as	  
discretionary	  quantitative	  export	  controls	  (QRs).	  The	  numbers	  in	  the	  last	  row	  indicate	  
that	  on	  average,	  during	  these	  years
3
,	  primary	  agricultural	  producers	  received	  prices	  that	  
were	  at	  least	  one	  third	  below	  international	  prices
4
.	  	  
These	  excessively	  high	  export	  barriers	  had	  visible	  costs	  on	  the	  country’s	  aggregate	  
agricultural	  output
5
.	  For	  example,	  in	  2014	  the	  area	  planted	  to	  wheat	  accounted	  for	  3.6	  
million	  hectares	  but	  by	  2019	  when	  the	  export	  barriers	  had	  been	  reduced,	  this	  area	  had	  
increased	  to	  5.3	  million	  hectares,	  or	  by	  47%.	  Table	  1	  shows	  that	  wheat	  was	  the	  product	  
most	  highly	  discriminated	  by	  export	  barriers.	  Likewise,	  the	  heavy-­‐handed	  QRs	  against	  
bovine	  meat	  exports	  that	  were	  implemented	  during	  these	  years,	   is	  the	  leading	  policy	  
explaining	  a	  reduction	  in	  the	  bovine	  stock	  from	  around	  60	  million	  heads	  to	  around	  50	  
million	   heads.
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   More	   generally,	   while	   the	   cereal	   	   output	   of	   the	   four	  main	   products	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  This	  is	  one	  major	  shortcoming	  of	  this	  Round,	  but	  there	  are	  others	  that	  have	  been	  reviewed	  for	  
example,	  in	  Finger	  and	  Nogues	  (2003).	  
	  
3
	  Time	  series	  of	  these	  barriers	  can	  be	  consulted	  in	  Nogues	  (2016).	  The	  numbers	  in	  Table	  1	  are	  
representative	  of	  the	  height	  of	  barriers	  that	  prevailed	  between	  2007	  and	  2015.	  Figure	  1	  and	  text	  
comments	  complement	  the	  discussion	  on	  the	  pattern	  of	  export	  taxes	  up	  to	  2019.	  
	  
4
	  Quantitative	  export	  restrictions	  on	  wheat	  and	  bovine	  meat	  were	  instituted	  in	  early	  2006	  as	  a	  response	  
to	  the	  2006-­‐2008	  food	  price	  inflation	  crisis	  (FAO	  2014).	  The	  criticisms	  to	  this	  policy	  response	  comes	  not	  




.	  Several	  studies	  have	  addressed	  the	  long-­‐run	  consequences	  of	  Argentina’s	  price	  discrimination	  against	  
agriculture	   including	   among	  others	  Colome	  et.	   al.	   (2011),	  Diaz	  Alejandro	   (1975),	  Nogués	   (2016),	   Reca	  
(1980),	  and	  Sturzenegger	  and	  Salazni	  (2007).	  	  
6
	  Wherever	  export	  QRs	  were	  applied,	  easy	  rents	  were	  created,	  and	  over	  these	  years	  their	  dollar	  value	  
reached	  a	  minimum	  of	  USD	  9	  billion	  (Nogues	  2016).	  How	  these	  rents	  were	  distributed	  is	  anyone’s	  guess.	  
	  
 5	  
(soybean,	  maize,	  wheat	  and	  sunflower)	  was	  around	  113	  million	  tons	  in	  2015,	  by	  2018	  
when	  export	  barriers	  had	  been	  lowered,	  it	  had	  increased	  to	  around	  130	  million	  tons.	  
	  
Table	  1:	  Export	  barriers	  on	  wheat,	  maize,	  bovine	  meat	  and	  soybean	  around	  2014	  (%)	  
Type	  of	  barrier	   Wheat	   Maize	   Bovine	  meat	   Soybean	  
Ad-­‐valorem	  export	  tax	   23	   20	   15	   35	  
Equivalent	  export	  tax	  of	  
quantitative	  restrictions	  
(QRs)	  
16	   17	   20	   0	  
Aggregate	  export	  barrier	   39	   37	   35	   35	  
Source:	  Author’s	  elaboration	  on	  the	  basis	  of	  data	  presented	  in	  Nogues	  (2016).	  
Argentina	   has	   a	   long	   tradition	   of	   promoting	   industrialization	   through	   high	   and	  
discretionary	  import	  barriers	  that	  implied	  an	  important	  export	  subsidy	  rate.	  Except	  for	  
short	  periods	  of	  time,	  ambitious	  import-­‐substitution	  policies	  have	  been	  sustained	  since	  
the	  early	  1930s.	   The	   costly	   and	  highly	  protectionist	  bent	  of	   the	  early	  post	  millennial	  
governments	   saw	   in	   the	   WTO	   legal	   vacuum	   on	   export	   barriers,	   an	   opportunity	   for	  
further	   industrialization	   of	   primary	   products	   by	   establishing	   escalated	   export	   taxes.	  
Under	   such	  a	  policy,	   soybean	  oil,	  wheat,	   and	  maize	  were	   taxed	  at	  higher	   rates	   than	  
biodiesel,	  wheat	  flower,	  and	  meat.	  For	  example,	  while	  the	  export	  tax	  on	  chicken	  meat	  
was	  5%,	  the	  tax	  on	  maize	  was	  around	  37%	  (Table	  1)	  implying	  a	  25%	  input	  subsidy	  rate	  
per	  dollar	  exported	  (Nogues	  2016).	  	  
The	   biodiesel	   industry	   was	   born	   and	   initially	   grew	   rapidly	   by	   the	   Government’s	  
arbitrary	  tuning	  of	  these	  export	  barriers.	  The	  goal	  was	  to	  develop	  a	  new	  agro-­‐processing	  
industry	   that	  would	   add	   further	   value	   to	   the	  50-­‐55	  million	   tons	  of	   soybean	   that	   the	  
country	  was	  producing	   annually.	   Consequently,	   in	   only	   three	   years,	   biodiesel	   output	  
increased	  from	  215	  thousand	  tons	  in	  2007,	  to	  2,800	  thousand	  tons	  in	  2012	  while	  exports	  
grew	  by	  close	  to	  ten	  times	  from	  163	  thousand	  tons	  in	  2008,	  to	  1,557	  thousand	  tons	  in	  
2012	  (Table	  4)	  when	  Argentina	  became	  the	  world	  leading	  exporter.	  	  
.	   Quite	  suddenly,	  here	  was	  a	  country	  that	  was	  rapidly	  encroaching	  international	  
biodiesel	  markets	  but	  it	  so	  happened	  that	  some	  of	  the	  destinations	  housed	  domestic	  
industries	  that	  their	  governments	  were	  ready	  to	  protect	  from	  “unfair	  competition”.	  By	  
resorting	   to	   the	  WTO	  agreements	   regulating	   the	   establishment	   of	   import	   barriers,	   a	  
 6	  
group	  of	  major	  importing	  countries	  sought	  ways	  to	  compensate	  the	  implicit	  subsidy	  in	  
biodiesel	  imports	  from	  Argentina.	  These	  barriers	  have	  taken	  the	  form	  of	  antidumping	  
surcharges	  (regulated	  by	  the	  WTO	  “Agreement	  on	  Implementation	  of	  Article	  VI	  of	  the	  
General	  Agreement	  on	  Tariff	  and	  Trade	  1994”	  published	   in	  WTO	  1995),	  and	   in	  some	  
cases	   countervailing	  measures	   (regulated	   by	   the	  WTO	   “Agreement	   on	   Subsidies	   and	  
Countervailing	  Measures”	  also	  in	  WTO	  1995).	  Requests	  for	  protection	  against	  biodiesel	  
imports	  from	  Argentina	  were	  raised	  in	  three	  destinations:	  the	  EU,	  Peru	  and	  the	  US.	  To	  
what	  extent	  did	   these	  barriers	  adjust	   to	   the	  multilateral	   rules?	  To	  what	  extent	  were	  
these	  instruments	  capable	  of	  counteracting	  the	  effects	  of	  subsidized	  biodiesel	  imports?	  
The	  evidence	  discussed	  in	  section	  IV,	  shows	  that	  under	  existing	  rules	  on	  contingent	  
protection	  (mainly	  antidumping	  and	  countervailing	  measures),	  barriers	  implemented	  by	  
importing	  countries	  have	  not	  always	  prevailed.	  In	  fact,	  in	  one	  clear	  and	  sounding	  WTO	  
dispute	  with	  Argentina,	  the	  EU	  was	  mandated	  by	  this	  organization’s	  Appellate	  Body	  to	  
reduce	  its	  initially	  high	  level	  of	  antidumping	  barriers.	  This	  ruling	  as	  we	  shall	  argue,	  can	  
also	  be	  traced	  to	  the	  fact	  that	  in	  the	  WTO,	  escalated	  export	  barriers	  remain	  unregulated.	  
	   During	  most	   of	   the	   period	  we	   study,	   the	  WTO	   remained	   in	   full	   control	   of	   its	  
mandate.	  Nevertheless	  more	  recently,	  Trump’s	  nationalistic	  policies	  have	  crippled	   its	  
Dispute	  Settlement	  Body	  (DSB)	  by	  refusing	  to	  appoint	  judges	  to	  its	  Appellate	  Body	  	  that	  
consequently,	  now	  remains	  non-­‐operational
7
.	  	  
The	   rest	   of	   the	   paper	   is	   organized	   as	   follows.	   In	   order	   to	   provide	   a	   benchmark	  
number	  against	  which	  to	  compare	  the	  importing	  countries’	  measures,	  Section	  II	  offers	  
an	   estimate	   of	   the	   subsidy	   rate	   created	   by	   escalated	   export	   taxes	   benefiting	   the	  
biodiesel	  industry.	  Section	  III	  provides	  an	  overview	  of	  the	  cyclical	  trend	  of	  Argentina’s	  
biodiesel	  exports	  related	  to	  the	  trade	  measures	  that	  over	  time	  were	  taken	  by	  the	  EU,	  
Peru	  and	  the	  US.	  Section	  IV	  offers	  a	  brief	  summary	  of	  the	  Argentina-­‐EU	  WTO	  dispute.	  
Section	  V	  concludes.	  
	  
II.   Input	  subsidies	  from	  escalated	  export	  barriers:	  estimate	  for	  Argentina’s	  
biodiesel	  exports	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  See	  for	  example,	  The	  Diplomat	  (2019).	  WTO	  Panels	  can	  still	  process	  disputes	  but	  unless	  there	  is	  a	  
previous	  agreement	  between	  the	  demanding	  and	  the	  responding	  parties,	  rulings	  cannot	  be	  enforced.	  
 7	  
Under	  escalated	  export	  taxes,	  the	  dollar	  value	  of	  the	  input	  subsidy	  per	  ton	  exported	  
(ISj)	  can	  be	  shown	  to	  equal:	  
ISj = −PIjDj + a1jPIa1jD1	  	  	  	  	  	  (1)	  
where	   j	   stands	   for	   biodiesel;	   ISj:	   input	   subsidy	   per	   ton	   of	   biodiesel	   exported;	   PIj:	  
international	   FOB	   price	   of	   biodiesel	   per	   ton;	   Dj:	   export	   tax	   rate	   on	   biodiesel;	   a1j:	  
quantity	  of	  soybean	  oil	  necessary	  to	  produce	  one	  ton	  of	  biodiesel;	  PIa1:	  FOB	  price	  of	  
soybean	  oil	  per	  ton;	  D1:	  export	  tax	  rate	  on	  soybean	  oil.	  Equation	  (1)	  is	  the	  difference	  
between	   revenues	   without	   and	   with	   escalated	   export	   taxes.	   Since	   other	   inputs	   are	  




The	  first	  term	  on	  the	  right	  hand	  side	  with	  a	  negative	  sign	  represents	  the	  reduced	  
income	  from	  the	  tax	  on	  biodiesel	  exports	  while	   the	  second	  term	  with	  a	  positive	  sign	  
represents	   the	   savings	   from	   lower	   input	   prices	   from	   the	   export	   tax	   on	   soybean	   oil.	  
Therefore	   input	   subsidies	   from	  escalated	  export	   taxes	   increase:	   i)	   as	   the	   tax	   rate	  on	  
biodiesel	  exports	  (Dj)	  is	  lowered;	  ii)	  with	  the	  physical	  intensity	  of	  subsidized	  soybean	  oil	  
(a1j)	   and,	   iii)	   the	   higher	   the	   export	   tax	   rate	   on	   this	   input	   (D1).	   The	   time	   invariant	  
parameters	  of	  this	  equation	  include:	  a)	  a1j=1,1	  according	  to	  industry	  experts	  one	  liter	  
of	  biodiesel	  output	  requires	  approximately	  1,1	  liters	  of	  soybean	  oil	  and,	  b)	  D1:	  32%	  is	  
the	  export	   tax	   rate	  on	  soybean	  oil	   that	   remained	  unchanged	  between	  2008	  and	   late	  
2015	  when	  they	  began	  to	  be	  gradually	  reduced.	  	  
Therefore,	  the	  aggregate	  yearly	  dollar	  value	  of	  input	  subsidies	  received	  by	  biodiesel	  
exporters	  (ARj),	  and	  the	  subsidy	  rate	  (SRj)	  are	  estimated	  by:	  
ARj = ISj	  x	  Ej	  	  	  (2)	  
SRj=ARj/PIjxEj	  
where	  Ej	  is	  yearly	  tons	  of	  biodiesel	  exports.	  	  
Table	  2	  presents	  estimates	  of	  these	  equations	  for	  the	  years	  between	  2010	  and	  2015.	  	  
Except	  for	  2013,	  the	  numbers	  in	  the	  last	  column	  show	  that	  the	  input	  subsidy	  rate	  varied	  
between	  15%	  and	  29%
9
.	  On	  the	  other	  hand,	  the	  aggregate	  dollar	  value	  of	  these	  subsidies	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  Soybean	  oil	  represents	  between	  80%	  and	  90%	  of	  biodiesel	  input	  costs	  (Cowley	  and	  Hillman	  2018).	  
	  
9
	  These	  input	  subsidy	  rates	  are	  not	  that	  different	  from	  the	  rates	  estimated	  for	  other	  agro-­‐industries	  whose	  
exports	  during	  these	  years	  also	  benefited	  from	  escalation	  of	  export	  taxes	  (Nogués	  2016).	  
	  
 8	  
peaked	  in	  2011	  with	  USD	  338	  million,	  and	  bottomed	  two	  years	  later	  in	  2013	  with	  USD	  
30	   million.	   This	   significant	   decline	   was	   mostly	   caused	   by:	   1)	   a	   16%	   decline	   in	  
international	  biodiesel	  prices,	  2)	  an	  increase	  in	  the	  tax	  rate	  on	  biodiesel	  exports	  from	  
17%	  to	  22%	  and,	  3)	  a	  26%	  decline	   in	  aggregate	  exports,	  primarily	  explained	  by	   lower	  
demand	   from	   the	  EU	  after	   it	   initiated	  an	  antidumping	   investigation	   (Section	   III).	   The	  
reverse	  occurred	  during	  2014,	  when	  the	  value	  of	  input	  subsidies	  increased	  again	  caused	  
primarily	  by	  a	  reduction	  in	  the	  average	  tax	  on	  biodiesel	  exports	  from	  22%	  to	  16%.	  	  
These	  are	  two	  instances	  illustrating	  just	  how	  unstable	  export	  taxes	  on	  biodiesel	  have	  
been	  and	  the	  extent	  to	  which	  they	  impact	  on	  the	  amount	  and	  rate	  of	  input	  subsidies.	  
For	  more	  recent	  years,	  Figure	  1	  offers	  a	  graphic	  illustration	  of	  this	  policy	  instability.	  It	  
shows	  high	  and	  quite	  stable	  export	  tax	  rates	  on	  soybeans	  and	  soybean	  oil	  that	  lasted	  
until	  2018	  when	  a	  	  period	  of	  sliding	  reductions	  was	  announced
10
.	  In	  contrast,	  the	  rate	  
on	  biodiesel	  exports	  remained	  highly	  unstable	  including	  at	  times,	  zero	  rates.	  On	  average,	  
between	  2007	  and	  2019	  the	  tax	  rate	  on	  biodiesel	  remained	  well	  below	  those	  applied	  on	  




Source:	  Author’s	  elaboration	  on	  the	  basis	  of	  the	  figure	  in	  INAI	  (2018)	  p13.	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  This	  preannounced	  sliding	  reduction	  was	  not	  always	  complied	  with	  as	  the	  discussion	  of	  the	  US	  
contingent	  measures	  in	  section	  III	  will	  show.	  See	  Federal	  Register	  (2019),	  and	  also	  INAI	  (2018a).	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   The	  new	  Government	  assuming	   in	  December	  2019	   rapidly	   revised	  export	   tax	   rates	  upward	  and	   for	  
soybean	  it	  now	  stands	  at	  33%.	  Although	  we	  have	  not	  computed	  the	  subsidy	  rate	  for	  recent	  years,	  the	  




























































































































































Figure	  1:	  Export	  tax	  rates	  on	  soybean,	  soybean	  oil	  and	  biodiesel	  	  (2015-­‐
2019)
Soybean Soybean	  oil Biodiesel
 9	  
In	  Argentina,	  the	  Executive	  holds	  the	  power	  to	  establish	  trade	  policies	  and	  therefore,	  
the	  changing	  value	  of	  export	  taxes	  on	  biodiesel	  should	  be	  seen	  as	  reflecting	  changing	  
circumstances	  surrounding	  including	  as	  we	  shall	  see,	  attempts	  to	  ameliorate	  the	  impact	  
of	  contingent	  barriers	  applied	  by	  importing	  countries.	  Such	  numerous	  adjustments	  are	  
evidence	  of	  what	  Krueger	  (1974)	  has	  characterized	  as	  rent-­‐seeking	  behavior.	  
Summing	  up,	  Argentina’s	  biodiesel	  exports	  have	  received	  important	  input	  subsidies	  
that	  have	  been	  fully	  financed	  by	  thousands	  of	  soybean	  producers	  who	  facing	  high	  export	  
taxes	   have	   sold	   their	   produce	   at	   prices	   that	   on	   average,	   have	   been	   1/3	   below	  
international	   prices.	   While	   biodiesel	   exporters	   gained	   handsome	   rents	   from	   these	  



































2010	   1,068	   914	   14%	   172	   1,358	   234	   19%	  
2011	   1,608	   1,211	   14%	   201	   1,682	   338	   16%	  
2012	   1,404	   1,157	   17%	   169	   1,557	   263	   15%	  
2013	   1,430	   967	   22%	   26	   1,149	   30	   3%	  
2014	   1,074	   833	   16%	   121	   1,603	   194	   16%	  
2015	   881	   682	   6.6%	   182	   788	   143	   29%	  
Notes:	  (a)	  estimated	  from	  equation	  (1)	  and,	  (b)	  IS	  per	  ton	  exported/value	  of	  exports	  per	  ton.	  	  
Source:	  Author’s	  elaboration	  based	  on	  data	  from:	  (i)	  FOB	  biodiesel	  prices:	  Biodiesel-­‐National	  Weekly	  Ag	  
Energy	   Roundup,	   USDA-­‐Agricultural	   Marketing	   Service,	  
http://www.ams.usda.gov/mnreports/lswagenergy.pdf,	   and	   Diesel-­‐U.S.DOE,	   Energy	   Information	  
Administration,	   Monthly	   Retail	   On-­‐Highway	   Diesel	   Prices	  
http://www.eia.gov/oog/info/wohdp/diesel.asp	   ;	   (ii)	  FOB	  soybean	  oil	  prices:	  Ministerio	  de	  Agricultura,	  
Argentina,	   (iii)	   export	   tax	   rate	  on	  biodiesel	   and	   soybean	  oil	   from	  AFIP	   (Agencia	   Federal	   de	   Impuestos	  
Publicos)	  and,	  iv)	  quantity	  and	  value	  of	  exports	  per	  ton	  estimated	  from	  Secretaria	  de	  Agroindustria	  (2019	  
and	  Table	  4).	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  We	  note	  that	  the	  bulk	  of	  soybeans	  harvested	  is	  not	  owned	  by	  biodiesel	  producers.	  The	  biodiesel	  and	  
the	  soybean	  oil	  industries	  are	  owned	  mostly	  by	  the	  same	  multinational	  grain	  exporting	  firms	  that	  hold	  no	  
significant	  investments	  in	  primary	  agricultural	  land.	  	  
 10	  
III.   Contingent	  protection	  against	  biodiesel	  imports	  from	  Argentina:	  measures	  
and	  trade	  impacts	  
As	   mentioned,	   Argentina’s	   biodiesel	   is	   made	   mainly	   from	   soybean	   oil,	   so	  
developing	   this	   industry	   was	   seen	   by	   private	   interests	   and	   the	   Government	   as	   an	  
opportunity	  to	  advance	  one	  step	  further	   in	  the	  processing	  stages	  of	  the	  domestically	  
harvested	  soybeans
13
.	  Around	  2007	  Argentina’s	  biodiesel	  industry	  was	  nonexistent,	  but	  
by	  2011/12,	  it	  had	  become	  the	  fourth	  world	  producer	  and	  the	  leading	  world	  exporter.	  
How	  did	  this	  occur	  so	  rapidly?	  	  
In	  2006	  concentrated	  multinational	  soybean	  oil	  exporters	  having	  a	  high	  degree	  
of	   overlap	   with	   major	   multinational	   grain	   trading	   companies
14
	   agreed	   with	   the	  
government	  on	  a	  set	  of	  incentives	  that	  would	  attract	  accelerated	  investment	  flows	  into	  
biodiesel	  production
15
.	  The	  initial	  takeoff	  of	  the	  biodiesel	  industry	  relied	  on	  export	  sales	  
that	  were	  supported	  by	  input	  subsidies	  from	  escalated	  export	  taxes.	  Starting	  in	  2008,	  
soybean	  oil	  exports	  faced	  a	  tax	  of	  32%	  that	  remained	  unchanged	  until	  late	  2015	  when	  it	  
began	  to	  be	  gradually	  reduced	  (Figure	  1).	  	  
Under	   Argentina’s	   accelerated	   export	   growth,	   it	   is	   no	   surprise	   that	   biodiesel	  
producers	   in	   importing	   countries	   sought	   to	   compensate	   its	   “unfair	   subsidies”	   with	  
import	  barriers.	  Table	  3	  summarizes	  the	  salient	  contingent	  protection	  actions	  taken	  by	  
the	   EU,	   Peru	   and	   the	   US,	   i.e.	   the	   three	   destinations	   that	   initiated	   and	   completed	  
contingent	   investigations	  against	   imports	   from	  Argentina.	   In	  what	   follows	  we	   review	  
these	  cases	  and	  their	  impact	  on	  Argentina’s	  biodiesel	  exports.	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  Biodiesel,	   it	  has	  been	  asserted,	  has	  environmental	  benefits	  as	   it	   is	  biodegradable,	  produced	   from	  a	  
renewable	  resource	  and	  mostly	  free	  of	  sulfur	  and	  aromatic	  compounds	  that	  are	  potentially	  carcinogenic.	  
It	   lowers	   CO2	   emissions	   thus	   reducing	   greenhouse	   gases	   (http://carbio.com.ar/certificacion/)	  
Nevertheless,	   there	  also	  are	   valid	   claims	  arguing	   that	  environmental	  benefits	   are	  not	  as	   important	  as	  
claimed	  by	  the	  industry	  in	  part	  because	  the	  expansion	  of	  soybean	  production	  has	  been	  at	  the	  expense	  of	  
the	  depletion	  of	  forests.	  See	  for	  example	  Keles	  and	  Choumert	  (2017),	  and	  Murnaghan	  (2017).	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  Some	  of	  the	  major	  firms	  include	  Cargill,	  Bunge,	  Vicentin,	  LDC	  Argentina,	  Molinos,	  etc.	  
	  
15
	  Although	  escalated	  export	  taxes	  have	  been	  the	  target	  of	  most	  contingent	  barriers,	  it	  is	  important	  to	  





Table	  4	  shows	  biodiesel	  exports	  for	  2007-­‐2018.	  In	  the	  case	  of	  the	  EU	  (Spain	  being	  
the	   country	  of	  entry)	  Argentina’s	  exports	  peaked	  during	  2011/2012	  but	  by	  2013	   the	  
boom	  receded	  when	  the	  industry	  began	  facing	  foreign	  trade	  barriers.	  In	  2012,	  the	  EU	  
initiated	  antidumping	  and	  countervailing	  investigations	  and	  exports	  to	  this	  destination	  
started	  falling.	  Between	  2011	  –the	  peak	  year	  of	  Argentina’s	  exports	  to	  the	  EU-­‐	  and	  2014	  
when	  the	  final	  determination	  of	  the	  antidumping	  investigation	  was	  published,	  they	  had	  
fallen	  by	  56%	  (Table	  4).	  
	  
	   	  
 12	  
Table	  3:	  Contingent	  protection	  measures	  against	  biodiesel	  imports	  from	  Argentina
16
	  
na:	  not	  applicable.	  
*This	  petition	  was	  initially	  presented	  to	  INDECOPI	  in	  2014	  but	  at	  this	  time,	  it	  was	  turned	  down.	  Later,	  the	  




Source:	  Author’s	  elaboration	  with	  information	  from	  sources	  indicated	  in	  the	  last	  column.	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  As	  mentioned,	  this	  list	  is	  not	  exhaustive	  of	  all	  the	  trade	  policy	  actions	  taken	  by	  these	  three	  countries	  
against	  biodiesel	  imports.	  For	  example,	  Peru	  still	  maintains	  measures	  against	  biodiesel	  from	  the	  US	  and	  
several	  of	  the	  EU	  cases	  covered	  in	  Table	  3,	  also	  included	  imports	  from	  Indonesia.	  
Country	   Date	  
Type	  of	  
action	  
Note	   Measure	   Source	  
European	  
Union	  
29/08/2012	   AD	   Initiation	  	   na	   Diario	  Oficial	  de	  la	  UE	  (29/8/2012)	  
	   26/11/2013	   AD	  
Final	  
determination	  
22%-­‐26%	   Diario	  Oficial	  de	  la	  UE	  (26/11/2013)	  
	   10/11/2012	   CVD	  	   Initiation	   na	   Diario	  Oficial	  de	  la	  UE	  (10/11/12)	  
	   25/04/2014	  
WTO	  Panel	  
on	  AD	  duties	  
Panel	  
established	  
AD	   WTO	  document:	  WT/DS473/AB/R	  









WTO	  document:	  WT/DS473/AB/R	  




of	  the	  Appellate	  
Body’s	  ruling	  
4,5%-­‐8,1%	   Diario	  Oficial	  de	  la	  UE	  (19/10/2018)	  
	   	   	   	   	   	  
Peru	   21/07/2014	   CVD	   Initiation	   na	   	  






	   26/04/2015	   AD	   Initiation	   na	   El	  Peruano	  25/10/2016*	  






	   05/12/2018	   Consultation	   Na	   na	   WTO	  (2016)	  
	   	   	   	   	   	  
US	   07/04/2017	   CVD	   Initiation	   na	  
International	  Trade	  Administration:	  
https://enforcement.trade.gov/download/factsheets/factsh
eet-­‐multiple-­‐biodiesel-­‐ad-­‐cvd-­‐initiation-­‐041317.pdf	  




International	  Trade	  Administration:	  
https://www.trade.gov/enforcement/factsheets/factsheet-­‐
multiple-­‐biodiesel-­‐cvd-­‐final-­‐110917.pdf	  










	   07/04/2017	   AD	   Initiation	   na	   	  

















Nevertheless,	  because	  Argentina	  found	  new	  export	  opportunities	  mostly	  in	  Peru	  
and	  the	  US,	  during	  these	  years	  and	  in	  quantity	  terms,	  aggregate	  biodiesel	  exports	  fell	  by	  
only	  5%	  (Table	  4).	  	  
Table	   4:	   Argentina’s	   biodiesel	   exports	   by	   country	   of	   destination	   (000	   tons	   unless	  
otherwise	  noted)	  	  
Country	   2007	   2011	   2012	   2013	   2014	   2015	   2016	   2017	   2018	  
Spain	  	   21	   890.0	   869.4	   270.5	   390.0	   6.3	   0	   90.0	   0	  
USA	   112.3	   0	   0	   413.6	   159.1	   593.5	   1,473.9	   963.3	   0	  
Peru	   0	   193.2	   166.5	   197.6	   261.7	   164.3	   145.5	   42.7	   16.2	  








133.1	   2,076.5	   987.5	   987.5	   1,244.3	   486.7	   1,175.8	   1,244.1	   977.7	  




It	  has	  long	  been	  shown	  that	  exports	  to	  a	  given	  destination	  start	  declining	  
around	  the	  date	  when	  the	  importing	  country	  initiates	  an	  antidumping	  and/or	  a	  CVD	  
investigation.	  For	  example	  in	  an	  early	  paper	  on	  this	  subject	  Prusa	  (1996)	  found	  that	  
even	  “…	  AD	  actions	  that	  are	  rejected	  still	  have	  an	  important	  impact	  on	  named	  country	  
trade,	  especially	  during	  the	  period	  of	  investigation…”	  (reference	  from	  this	  paper’s	  
abstract).	  The	  EU	  completed	  its	  AD	  investigation	  in	  November	  2013	  when	  Argentina’s	  
exports	  stood	  at	  270.5	  million	  tons,	  a	  reduction	  of	  70%	  from	  the	  amount	  exported	  in	  
2011.	  
The	  EU	  proceeded	  to	  implement	  antidumping	  barriers	  that	  varied	  between	  22%	  
and	  26%	  according	  to	  the	  exporting	  company	  (Table	  3)
17
.	  These	  orders	  of	  magnitude	  are	  
                                                
17
	   The	   investigations’	   findings	   showed	   higher	   margins	   of	   dumping	   than	   those	   reported	   in	   Table	   3.	  
Nevertheless,	  given	  the	  EU’s	  lesser	  duty	  policy,	  the	  effective	  rates	  the	  EU	  Commission	  finally	  imposed	  are	  
those	  shown	  in	  this	  table.	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not	  far	  from	  the	  rates	  of	  input	  subsidies	  reported	  in	  Section	  II.	  Nevertheless,	  Argentina’s	  
legal	   advisors	   concluded	   that	   the	   EU’s	   investigation	   had	   flaws	   and	   consequently	   the	  
Government	   decided	   to	   challenge	   its	   AD	   measures	   particularly	   the	   way	   in	   which	   it	  
determined	  the	  margin	  of	  dumping.	  The	  next	  section	  offers	  a	  brief	  summary	  of	  why	  the	  
WTO	  Panel	  and	  Appellate	  Body	  sided	  with	  Argentina.	  In	  spite	  of	  this,	  we	  note	  that	  during	  
the	  length	  of	  time	  elapsed	  between	  the	  initiation	  of	  the	  antidumping	  investigation	  and	  
the	  Appellate	  Body	  ruling	  in	  2016,	  the	  EU	  industry	  continued	  protected	  with	  high	  levels	  
of	  antidumping	  barriers	  that	  partially	  explains	  why	  exports	  to	  this	  destination	  have	  not	  
resumed	  in	  significant	  quantities
18
.	  
Although	  as	  said,	  in	  late	  2012	  the	  EU	  dropped	  the	  subsidy	  investigation,	  it	  is	  of	  
interest	  to	  cite	  the	  reason	  why	  it	  was	  opened	  in	  the	  first	  place:	  “The	  subsidies	  consist	  of	  
the	  provision	  of	  inputs	  (soybean	  or	  soybean	  oil	  in	  case	  of	  Argentina	  and	  palm	  oil	  in	  case	  
of	  Indonesia)	  at	  below-­‐market	  prices	  by	  means	  of	  government	  policies	  implemented	  and	  
enforced	   by	   a	   policy	   of	   export	   taxes.	   In	   both	   countries	   concerned19,	   an	   export	   tax	   is	  
charged	  on	  the	  input	  product(s),	  at	  rate(s)	  which	  is/are	  often	  higher	  than	  that	  charged	  
on	  the	  export	  of	  biodiesel.	  This	  approach	  effectively	  obliges	  the	  input	  producers	  to	  sell	  
on	  the	  domestic	  market,	  thus	  creating	  an	  excess	  of	  supply,	  depressing	  prices	  to	  a	  below-­‐
market	   level	  and	  artificially	  reducing	  the	  costs	  of	  the	  biodiesel	  producers.	   It	   is	  alleged	  
that	  the	  above	  schemes	  are	  subsidies	  since	  they	  involve	  a	  financial	  contribution	  from	  the	  
Government	  of	  Argentina	  and	  Indonesia	  (in	  the	  form	  of	  the	  entrustment	  and/or	  direction	  
of	  the	  input	  producers	  to	  provide	  goods	  to	  the	  domestic	  biodiesel	  industry,	  or	  through	  
income	  or	  price	  support)	  and	  confer	  a	  benefit	  to	  the	  recipients	  because	  the	  goods	  are	  
provided	  for	  less	  than	  adequate	  remuneration.	  They	  are	  alleged	  to	  be	  limited	  to	  certain	  
enterprises	  producing	  a	  subset	  of	  products	  in	  the	  agricultural	  sector,	  and	  are	  therefore	  
specific	  and	  countervailable”	  (European	  Union	  2012).	  According	  to	  the	  CVD	  Agreement,	  
a	  countervailing	  duty	  has	  to	  meet	  two	  tests:	  1)	  there	  must	  be	  a	  financial	  contribution	  by	  
the	  government	   (Article	  1	  of	   the	  CVD	  agreement)	  and,	  2)	  such	  a	  contribution	  should	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  More	  generally,	  assuming	  that	  a	  trade	  action	  is	  subject	  to	  a	  WTO	  dispute,	  the	  lapse	  of	  time	  between	  
the	  initiation	  of	  an	  investigation	  and	  the	  implementation	  of	  the	  AB	  ruling	  covers	  several	  years.	  Table	  3	  
shows	  that	  in	  the	  case	  of	  biodiesel	  this	  lapse	  of	  time	  was	  six	  years	  from	  2012	  to	  2018.	  	  
	  
19
	  Indonesia	  is	  the	  other	  country.	  
 15	  
confer	   benefits	   to	   a	   specific	   firm	  or	   industry	   (Article	   2	   of	   the	   CVD	   agreement	   (WTO	  
2016).	  Given	   the	  absence	  of	  direct	   financial	   contribution	  and	   that	  export	  barriers	  on	  
soybean	   oil	   are	   not	   specifically	   targeted	   to	   benefit	   the	   biodiesel	   industry,	   the	   CVD	  




After	  the	  boom	  and	  burst	  experience	  of	  Argentina’s	  biodiesel	  exports	  to	  the	  EU,	  
the	  export	  pattern	  continued	   to	  be	  cyclical	   growing	   initially	   fast	   to	  new	  markets	  but	  
quite	  promptly	  they	  start	  declining	  around	  the	  time	  some	  of	  these	  countries	  initiate	  AD	  
and/or	  CVD	  investigations.	  In	  much	  the	  same	  way	  as	  shown	  by	  the	  experience	  in	  the	  EU,	  
Peru	  became	  a	  chosen	  market	  that	  although	  not	  as	  significant,	  it	  maintained	  open	  trade	  
for	   biodiesel,	   or	   so	   it	   appeared	   initially.	   Following	   the	   request	   from	   the	   domestic	  
biodiesel	  producer,	  the	  government	  initiated	  a	  CVD	  investigation	  in	  August	  2014	  –the	  
peak	  year	  of	  Argentina’s	  exports	  to	  this	  destination-­‐,	  and	  an	  antidumping	  case	  in	  April	  
2015.	  Definite	  CVD	  measures	  were	  implemented	  in	  2015
21
,	  and	  AD	  duties	  in	  2016	  (Table	  
3).	  Consequently,	  exports	  to	  Peru	  declined	  from	  262	  thousand	  tons	  in	  2014,	  to	  only	  16	  
thousand	  tons	  in	  2018,	  or	  by	  94%	  (Table	  4)
22
.	  	  
Although	  the	  CVD	  measures	  were	  low,	  the	  antidumping	  duties	  reported	  in	  Table	  
3	  are	  higher	  although	  not	  as	  high	  as	  those	  that	  were	  initially	  established	  by	  the	  EU
23
.	  It	  
is	  of	   interest	   to	  note	   that	   in	   this	   case	   INDECOPI	   (Instituto	  Nacional	  de	  Defensa	  de	   la	  
                                                
20
	  The	  CVD	  rules	  and	  their	  applicability	  in	  this	  case	  are	  also	  discussed	  in	  Cowley	  and	  Hillman	  (2017).	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  An	  analysis	  of	  the	  programs	  countervailed	  by	  Peru	  can	  be	  found	  in	  Report	  007-­‐2016/CBD-­‐INDECOPI.	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  We	  note	  that	  Argentina’s	  exports	  to	  Peru	  were	  already	  at	  a	  high	  level	  before	  2014	  in	  part	  because	  in	  
earlier	  years	  this	  country	  had	  implemented	  AD	  duties	  against	  biodiesel	  imports	  from	  the	  US	  that	  were	  still	  
in	   place	   by	   2015	   (https://enforcement.trade.gov/trcs/foreignadcvd/peru.html).	   Consequently,	   at	   the	  
time,	  Peru’s	  biodiesel	  importers	  shifted	  sources	  from	  the	  US,	  to	  other	  countries	  including	  Argentina.	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  Using	  the	  simple	  average	  of	  the	  extreme	  AD	  specific	  duties	  in	  table	  3	  (USD	  122	  and	  USD	  192	  per	  ton)	  
and	  the	  2014	  biodiesel	  price	  in	  Table	  2,	  Peru’s	  implicit	  average	  AD	  rate	  is	  15%.	  An	  independent	  estimate	  
presented	  in	  the	  Biodiesel	  Magazine	  puts	  Argentina’s	  “underpricing	  of	  biodiesel	  exports”	  to	  Peru	  in	  the	  
17%	  to	  31%	  range.	  When	  commenting	  on	  Peru’s	  AD	  measures,	  this	  source	  explained	  that	  “…Argentina	  
biodiesel	   pricing	   benefits	   from	   differential	   export	   taxes	   which	   help	   to	   keep	   prices	   lower	   than	   most	  





Competencia	  y	  de	  la	  Protección	  de	  la	  Propiedad	  Intelectual),	  Peru’s	  agency	  in	  charge	  of	  
administering	   the	   WTO	   contingent	   protection	   agreements,
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   also	   opted	   for	  
“reconstructing”	  Argentina’s	  domestic	  price.	  The	  investigation	  by	  INDECOPI	  argued	  that	  
prices	  and	  quantities	  of	  biodiesel	  sales	  in	  Argentina’s	  domestic	  market	  are	  regulated	  by	  




As	   was	   the	   case	   with	   the	   EU,	   Argentina	   had	   problems	   with	   INDECOPI’s	  
investigation	  and	  in	  December	  2018	  it	  began	  the	  initial	  steps	  (consultation)	  required	  for	  
eventually	   moving	   to	   a	   full-­‐fledged	   dispute	   under	   the	   rules	   of	   the	   WTO	   Dispute	  
Settlement	  Body.	  Argentina	  contended	  that	  “…Peru	  failed	  to	  determine	  the	  margin	  of	  
dumping	   by	   comparison	   with	   the	   cost	   of	   production	   in	   the	   country	   of	   origin…”	   as	  
indicated	  by	  the	  Antidumping	  Agreement	  (WTO	  2016).	  In	  regard	  to	  the	  CVD	  measures	  
Argentina	  argued	   that:	   “…Peru	   failed	   to	  conduct	  an	  objective	  examination,	  based	  on	  
positive	  evidence	  of	  other	  factors	  that	  may	  have	  caused	  injury	  to	  the	  domestic	  industry	  
and,	   consequently,	   attributed	   the	   injury	   caused	   by	   other	   factors	   to	   the	   allegedly	  
subsidized	   and	   dumped	   imports…”	   (see	   also	   Cowley	   and	  Hillman,	   2017).	  Argentina’s	  
arguments	  never	  became	  part	  of	  a	  full-­‐fledged	  WTO	  dispute	  probably	  because	  shortly	  





After	  exports	  to	  the	  EU	  and	  Peru	  collapsed,	  the	  US	  became	  a	  major	  destination	  
of	  Argentina’s	  biodiesel	  exports.	  History	  by	  repeating	  itself	  once	  again,	  would	  show	  that	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   Peru’s	   INDECOPI	   is	   one	   of	   the	   several	   agencies	   created	   by	   Latin	   American	   countries	   in	   order	   to	  
administer	  the	  WTO	  agreements	  on	  contingent	  protection.	  At	  the	  time	  of	  its	  assessment,	  this	  agency	  was	  
shown	  to	  be	  another	  example	  of	  a	  professional	  administration	  of	  the	  WTO	  rules	  (Finger	  and	  Nogues	  2006).	  
	  
25
	  See	  also	  Sonnet	  and	  others	  (2014),	  for	  a	  detailed	  discussion	  of	  Argentina’s	  governmental	  regulations	  in	  
the	  domestic	  market.	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  The	  reason	  lies	  in	  the	  US	  opposition	  to	  support	  candidates	  that	  have	  come	  up	  for	  filling	  the	  vacant	  chairs	  
in	  the	  Appellate	  Body.	  Currently,	  there	  is	  only	  one	  judge	  while	  three	  out	  of	  a	  maximum	  of	  seven	  is	  the	  
minimum	   required	   for	   quorum	   (The	  Diplomat	   2019).	   This	   has	   paralyzed	   the	  WTO	  dispute	   settlement	  
mechanism	  at	  a	  time	  when	  demands	  for	  its	  services	  are	  running	  at	  an	  all	  time	  high.	  For	  a	  discussion	  on	  




export	  growth	  to	  this	  destination	  would	  soon	  also	  collapse.	  Table	  4	  shows	  that	  biodiesel	  
exports	  to	  the	  US	  increased	  from	  159	  thousand	  tons	  in	  2014,	  to	  1,474	  thousand	  tons	  in	  
2016,	  or	  by	  more	  than	  nine	  times	  in	  two	  years.	  In	  2017,	  the	  US	  initiated	  antidumping	  
and	  CVD	  investigations	  that	  eventually	  ended	  in	  unexplainable	  high	  import	  barriers	  and	  
consequently,	  by	  2018	  biodiesel	  exports	  to	  this	  destination	  were	  “zero”,	  and	  have	  since	  
remained	  at	  this	  level	  since	  then.	  
In	  the	  CVD	  case,	  the	  US	  line	  of	  argumentation	  was	  that:	  “…	  domestic	  prices	  for	  
soybeans	  were	  below	  world	  market	  prices	  by	  more	  than	  $100	  per	  metric	  ton,	  depending	  
on	   the	  month,	   as	   a	   result	   of	   the	   export	   tax	   on	   soybeans…”. As	   to	   the	   targeting	   rule	  
required	  by	  the	  CVD	  agreement,	  the	  US	  Government	  explained	  that	  the	  GOA	  had	  stated	  
that	  “…export	  duties	  are	  a	  valid	  development	  tool,	  since	  they	  enable	  many	  developing	  
countries	   to	   cease	   being	   mere	   suppliers	   of	   raw	   materials	   …”	   (International	   Trade	  
Administration	  as	  referenced	  in	  Table	  3).	  This	  argument	  by	  Argentina	  was	  a	  shot	  in	  its	  
foot	  as	  it	  was	  used	  by	  the	  US	  to	  argue	  that	  export	  tax	  escalation	  is	  a	  development	  tool	  
and	   therefore	   the	   input	   subsidy	   they	   create	   is	   a	   specific	   subsidy.	   In	   the	   final	  
determination	  reached	  on	  November	  2017,	  the	  US	  established	  absurdly	  high	  CVD	  duties	  
of	  71%-­‐72%	  (Table	  3).	  	  
On	  the	  antidumping	  case	  the	  US	  government	  concluded	  that:	  “We	  consequently	  
find	  that	  the	  subject	  imports	  had	  significant	  price	  effects.	  They	  significantly	  undersold	  
the	  domestic	  like	  product	  and	  this	  underselling	  led	  to	  a	  significant	  shift	  in	  market	  share	  
away	  from	  the	  domestic	  industry	  and	  towards	  subject	  imports	  throughout	  the	  period	  of	  
investigation.	   They	   also	   prevented	   the	   domestic	   industry	   from	   increasing	   prices	  
commensurately	  with	  costs	  in	  2016	  and	  in	  2017”	  (USITC	  2017,	  p.	  31	  of	  reference	  in	  Table	  
3).	  Consequently,	  in	  April	  2018	  the	  US	  established	  final	  antidumping	  duties	  also	  absurdly	  
high	  ranging	  from	  60%	  to	  86%	  (Table	  3)
27
.	  	  
Adding	   the	   initial	   CVD	   surcharges	   and	   the	   antidumping	   duties	   implies	   an	  
unreasonably	  high	  US	  import	  barrier	  in	  the	  order	  of	  150%	  i.e.	  around	  six	  times	  higher	  
than	  our	  estimate	  of	  the	  input	  subsidy	  from	  escalated	  export	  taxes	  (Section	  II),	  and	  still	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  Note	  that	   these	  arguments	  attribute	  the	  existence	  of	  subsidies	  and	  dumping	  to	  the	  same	  cause	   i.e.	  
prices	  of	  soybean	  oil	  below	  world	  prices.	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higher	  differences	  with	  the	  barriers	  that	  the	  EU	  and	  Peru	  had	  implemented	  earlier.	  In	  
attempting	   to	   reduce	   the	   damage	   to	   its	   biodiesel	   industry,	   in	   September	   2018	   the	  
government	  of	  Argentina	  issued	  a	  series	  of	  Decrees	  that	  reduced	  quite	  considerably	  the	  
degree	  of	  escalation	  of	  export	  taxes	  to	  a	  low	  4%	  differential.	  The	  expectation	  was	  that	  
the	  US	  would	  reconsider	  the	  height	  of	  the	  import	  barriers	  it	  had	  initially	  imposed.	  The	  
Federal	  Register	  (2019	  reference	  in	  Table	  3)	  stated	  that:	  “…as	  of	  September	  2018,	  the	  
export	  tax	  on	  soybeans	  stood	  at	  28.3	  percent	  (nearly	  identical	  to	  where	  it	  was	  during	  the	  
POIs)	  and	  the	  export	  tax	  on	  biodiesel	  stood	  at	  25.3	  percent	  (versus	  3.96	  percent	  through	  
May	   2016	   and	   5.04	   percent	   from	   June	   2016	   until	   June	   2017,	   at	   which	   point	   it	   was	  
lowered	   to	   zero)	   …”	   (reference	   in	   Table	   3).	   Consequently,	   with	   this	   action	   the	   US	  
accepted	  to	  undertake	  a	  review	  of	  “Change	  of	  Circumstances”	  that	  eventually	  led	  to	  the	  
establishment	  of	  much	  lower	  CVD	  surcharges:	  from	  71%-­‐72%	  to	  0,2%-­‐10%	  (Table	  3).	  	  
Nevertheless,	   the	   US	   stood	   by	   its	   earlier	   decisions	   on	   antidumping	   duties:	  
“…after	  reviewing	  the	  record	  evidence	  …	  under	  the	  totality	  of	  circumstances	  analysis	  of	  
the	  AD	   investigation,	  we	   find	   that	   there	   remains	  a	  price	  gap	   that	  still	  exists	  between	  
domestic	  and	  world	  prices,	  as	  a	  result	  of	  the	  export	  tax	  on	  soybeans...	  Thus,	  we	  find	  that	  
there	  are	  insufficient	  changed	  circumstances	  to	  warrant	  a	  reconsideration	  of	  our	  finding	  
that	   the	   GOA's	   intervention	   in	   soybean	   pricing	   through	   the	   export	   tax	   on	   soybeans	  
renders	   prices	   paid	   by	   biodiesel	   producers	   outside	   the	   ordinary	   course	   of	   trade…”	  
(Federal	  Register	  9/7/2019	  see	  Table	  3).	  	  
The	   US	   antidumping	   measures	   remain	   well	   above	   reasonable	   orders	   of	  
magnitude	  of	  input	  subsidies	  to	  a	  degree	  that	  they	  are	  suspect	  of	  being	  in	  violation	  of	  
the	  WTO	  rules.	  If	  so,	  Argentina	  would	  have	  had	  a	  chance	  of	  contesting	  these	  barriers	  
but	  for	  the	  reasons	  mentioned	  regarding	  the	  non-­‐operation	  of	  the	  WTO	  Appellate	  Body,	  
this	  option	  is	  no	  longer	  open.	  	  
Export	  response	  to	  contingent	  protection	  actions	  
Figure	   2	   shows	   that	   between	   2011	   and	   2017	   aggregate	   biodiesel	   exports	  
remained	  highly	  cyclical	  averaging	  around	  1,400	  thousand	  tons	  per	  year	  but	  following	  
US	  measures,	  they	  are	  now	  on	  a	  free	  fall.	  The	  figure	  also	  portrays	  the	  trade	  impact	  of	  
contingent	  protection	  actions.	  Validating	  Prusa’s	  (1994)	  findings	  the	  figure	  shows	  that	  
each	   peak	   year	   is	   followed	   by	   a	   decline	   in	   exports	   associated	   with	   the	   initiation	   of	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contingent	   protection	   investigation/decision.	   This	   occurred	   in	   2012-­‐13	   with	   the	   EU	  
investigation;	   in	   2014-­‐15	   with	   Peru’s	   investigation,	   and	   in	   2016-­‐17	   with	   the	   US	  
investigation.	  Furthermore,	  estimates	  suggest	  that	  during	  2019	  the	  industry	  had	  around	  
a	   50%	   idle	   capacity.	   This,	   plus	   the	   dim	   export	   outlook	   from	   the	   accumulation	   of	  
contingent	  protection	  barriers	  leaves	  the	  industry	  with	  no	  other	  feasible	  choice	  but	  to	  
seek	  increasing	  sales	  to	  the	  domestic	  market.	  In	  essence,	  this	  option	  translates	  into	  a	  
government	  decision	  to	  increase	  the	  cut	  of	  diesel	  with	  biodiesel	  that	  now	  stands	  at	  10%.	  
As	  hinted	  by	  a	  Congress	  member	  who	  recently	  proposed	  increasing	  this	  rate	  to	  “at	  least”	  
27%,	  the	  lobbying	  and	  rent-­‐seeking	  process	  on	  this	  government	  policy	  has	  started
28
.	  	  
Figure	  2:	  Argentina’s	  biodiesel	  exports:	  2007-­‐2019	  (thousand	  tons)	  
	  
Source:	  Based	  on	  Table	  4.	  
IV.   WTO	  Appellate	  Body	  ruling	  against	  the	  EU’s	  AD	  duties
29
	  
As	  mentioned,	  in	  March	  of	  2014	  Argentina	  requested	  the	  WTO	  to	  form	  a	  Panel	  
that	  should	  decide	  whether	  the	  EU	  antidumping	  investigation	  had	  abided	  by	  the	  WTO	  
rules	   in	   the	   Antidumping	   Agreement.	   The	   Panel’s	   Report	   sided	   with	   Argentina	   and	  
following	  appeal	  by	  the	  EU,	  the	  Appellate	  Body	  distributed	  its	  findings	  on	  October	  2016	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  This	  section	  relies	  quite	  heavily	  on	  Cowley	  and	  Hillman	  (2017).	  A	  summary	  of	  this	  case	  can	  be	  found	  in	  
WTO	  (2016a).	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upholding	  the	  Panel’s	  decision.	  The	  driving	  issue	  referred	  to	  the	  EU’s	  estimate	  of	  the	  
margin	  of	  dumping	  defined	   in	  the	  AD	  Agreement	  to	  be	  present	  when	  a	  product	  “…is	  
introduced	  into	  the	  commerce	  of	  another	  country	  at	  less	  than	  its	  normal	  value,	  if	  the	  
export	  price	  of	  the	  product	  from	  one	  country	  to	  another	   is	   less	  than	  the	  comparable	  
price,	   in	   the	   ordinary	   course	   of	   trade,	   for	   the	   like	   product	   when	   destined	   for	  
consumption	   in	   the	   exporting	   country…”	   (WTO	  1995,	   article	   2.1	   of	   the	  Antidumping	  
Agreement	  p	  168).	  Therefore,	  the	  higher	  the	  domestic	  price	   in	  relation	  to	  the	  export	  
price,	  the	  higher	  the	  margin	  of	  dumping	  and	  consequently,	  the	  higher	  the	  AD	  barrier	  
that	  authorities	  are	  entitled	  to	  establish.	  	  
Most	  often	  this	  margin	  is	  estimated	  by	  comparing	  the	  price	  of	  sales	  in	  the	  home	  
market	  (“normal	  value”	  in	  the	  language	  of	  the	  AD	  agreement),	  with	  the	  export	  price	  or	  
the	  price	  at	  which	  the	  product	  is	  sold	  in	  the	  importing	  country.	  As	  mentioned,	  the	  AD	  
agreement	  identifies	  two	  cases	  when	  the	  normal	  value	  can	  differ	  from	  the	  home	  market	  
price:	  i)	  when	  there	  are	  no	  significant	  home	  market	  sales	  or,	  ii)	  when	  there	  are	  particular	  
home	  market	  situations	  that	  prevent	  relying	  on	  home	  market	  prices.	  When	  i)	  or	  ii)	  are	  
present,	  the	  rules	  in	  the	  AD	  agreement	  allow	  the	  “normal	  value”	  to	  be	  estimated	  from	  
“cost	  of	  production”.	  The	  EU	  considered	   that	   the	  export	   tax	  on	  soybeans	  created	  an	  
unfair	  cost	  advantage	  to	  biodiesel	  producers	  so	  it	  decided	  to	  reconstruct	  prices.	  	  
Argentina’s	   line	   of	   argumentation	   was	   that	   in	   estimating	   normal	   value,	   the	  
Commission	  should	  have	  used	  “…	  actual	  prices	  paid	  for	  goods	  in	  the	  country	  of	  origin,	  
no	  matter	  how	  distorted	  or	  far	  from	  reality	  such	  prices	  might	  be”.	  In	  turn,	  the	  EU	  argued	  
that	  the	  rules	  do	  not	  require	  to	  “…	  blindly	  follow	  actual	  prices	  paid	  if	  those	  prices	  bear	  
no	  rational	  relationship	  to	  a	  ‘real	  price’	  due	  to	  government’s	  intervention	  that	  distort	  
the	  actual	  prices…”	  (Cowley	  and	  Hillman	  2017	  p7).	   In	  the	  event,	  both	  the	  WTO	  Panel	  
and	  its	  Appellate	  Body	  sided	  with	  Argentina	  and	  the	  EU	  had	  to	  reduce	  the	  antidumping	  
rates	   quite	   significantly	   (Table	   3).	   Following	   these	   rulings,	   Argentina	  was	   free	   to	   set	  
escalated	  export	  taxes	  discretionally,	  while	  the	  EU	  was	  prevented	  from	  compensating	  
this	  unfair	  policy.	  Both	  policy	  effects	  are	  rooted	  in	  the	  absence	  of	  WTO	  on	  agricultural	  
export	  barriers.	  
In	   the	   abstract	   of	   their	   paper,	   Cowley	   and	   Hillman	   (2017)	   summarized	   the	  
outcome	   of	   the	   Appellate	   Body	   ruling	   by	   stating	   that:	   “In	   this	   case,	   the	   EU	   made	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adjustments	  to	  the	  price	  of	  biodiesel’s	  principal	  input	  –	  soybeans	  –	  in	  determining	  the	  
cost	  of	  production	  of	  biodiesel	   in	  Argentina.	  The	  adjustment	  was	  made	  based	  on	   the	  
uncontested	   finding	   that	   the	   price	   of	   soybeans	   in	   Argentina	   was	   distorted	   by	   the	  
existence	  of	  an	  export	  tax	  scheme	  that	  resulted	  in	  artificially	  low	  soybean	  prices…”.	  The	  
adjustment	  to	  the	  domestic	  price	  of	  soybeans	  and	  soybean	  oil	   took	   into	  account	  the	  
impact	   of	   export	   taxes	   falling	   on	   these	   products.	   Nevertheless,	   the	   Appellate	   Body	  
“...found	  that	  the	  EU	  was	  not	  permitted	  to	  take	  tax	  policy-­‐induced	  price	  distortions	  into	  
account	  in	  calculating	  dumping	  margins.	  Consequently,	  the	  AB	  ruled	  that	  the	  EU	  should	  
adjust	  its	  antidumping	  duties	  and	  on	  October,	  2018	  they	  were	  lowered	  from	  from	  22-­‐
26%,	  to	  4,5%-­‐8,1%	  (Table	  3).	  	  
At	  the	  time,	  the	  Appellate	  Body	  ruling	  in	  the	  Argentina-­‐EU	  case	  would	  appear	  to	  
have	   closed	   the	  door	   for	  other	   countries	  attempting	   to	   compensate	  with	   contingent	  
protection	   barriers,	   the	   input	   subsidies	   created	   by	   escalated	   export	   taxes.	   This,	  
nevertheless,	  has	  not	  been	  the	  case.	  Since	  the	  Appellate	  Body	  ruling	  against	  the	  EU	  was	  
circulated	  in	  2016,	  Peru	  and	  the	  US	  initiated	  and	  reached	  final	  positive	  determinations	  
in	  AD	  investigations	  (Table	  3).	  Argentina	  might	  have	  also	  opted	  to	  legally	  challenge	  these	  
barriers	   but	   unless	   the	   Trump-­‐driven	   measures	   that	   have	   translated	   into	   a	   non-­‐





V.   Final	  remarks	  	  
The	  experience	  of	  contingent	  protection	  measures	  against	  subsidized	  biodiesel	  
imports	  from	  Argentina	  point	  to	  a	  number	  of	  conclusions	  including	  that:	  i)	  lack	  of	  WTO	  
rules	  on	  primary	  agricultural	  export	  barriers	  facilitated	  Argentina’s	  implementation	  of	  
high	  and	  costly	  export	  barriers;	  ii)	  these	  barriers	  were	  then	  tuned	  to	  subsidize	  a	  nascent	  
biodiesel	   industry	   that	   in	   its	   early	   years	   showed	   accelerated	   export	   growth;	   iii)	   in	  
contrast,	   application	   of	   WTO	   contingent	   protection	   measures	   to	   compensate	   these	  
subsidies,	  encountered	  difficulties	  to	  an	  extent	  that	  a	  WTO	  Panel	  and	  the	  Appellate	  Body	  
ruled	   in	   favor	   of	   Argentina	   and	   against	   the	   EU’s	   antidumping	   duties,	   iv)	   the	   reason	  
                                                
30
	  This	  quotation	  is	  from	  an	  anonymous	  referee	  who	  stressed	  this	  point	  forcefully.	  On	  Trump’s	  policies	  
see	  for	  example	  Bown	  and	  Irwin	  (2019),	  and	  Krueger	  (2020).	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underlying	  this	  decision	  can	  also	  be	  traced	  to	  the	  absence	  of	  WTO	  rules	  on	  agricultural	  
export	  barriers	  and,	  v)	  more	  recently,	  Peru	  and	  the	  US	  also	  initiated	  and	  implemented	  
contingent	  measures	  with	  the	  later	  imposing	  absurdly	  high	  barriers.	  
Argentina	  could	  have	  eventually	  challenged	  these	  barriers	  but	  the	  US	  has	  now	  
crippled	  the	  WTO	  Dispute	  Settlement	  Mechanism	  and	  importing	  countries	  are	  no	  longer	  
threatened	  by	  dispute	  outcomes	  as	  the	  faced	  by	  the	  EU.	  Under	  this	  scenario	  the	  future	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